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The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance 





  We examine the effects of the most durable employer health insurance mandate in the 
United States, Hawaii’s Prepaid Health Care Act, using Current Population Survey data covering 
the years 1979 to 2005.  We find that Hawaii’s law increased insurance coverage over time for 
worker groups with low rates of coverage in the voluntary market.  We find no statistically 
significant support for the hypothesis that the mandate reduced wages and employment 
probabilities.  Instead, its primary detectable effect was an increased reliance on part-time 
workers who are exempt from the law.  We arrive at these conclusions in part by use of a 
variation of the classical Fisher permutation test that compares the magnitude of the estimated 
“Hawaii effect” to “placebo effects” estimated for the other US states. 
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The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance  
Coverage and the Demand for Labor:  Evidence from Hawaii 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Long before passage of the federal health care reform act in 2010, which eventually will 
impose an individual mandate to obtain health insurance, policy makers had considered the 
alternative approach of employer health insurance mandates as a strategy for expanding 
coverage.  At the Federal level, the failed health care reform plans proposed by the Nixon 
administration in the early 1970s and the Clinton administration twenty years later both included 
an employer mandate.  At the state level, laws imposing employer mandates in Massachusetts 
(1988), Oregon (1989), Washington (1993), and California (2003) were overturned by voter 
referendums or voided due to conflicts with the federal Employee Retirement Insurance Security 
Act (ERISA).  Since these laws have not been adopted, direct evidence regarding the effects of 
an employer sponsored insurance (ESI) mandate is scarce.  One state law that has been enforced 
for over two decades and therefore provides a potential source of information on ESI mandates is 
Hawaii’s Prepaid Health Care Act (PHCA).  Hawaii’s mandate requires that essentially all 
private sector employers provide health insurance coverage to employees working at least 20 
hours per week on a regular basis.   
  Despite the significance of Hawaii’s law and its relevance to ongoing policy debates, 
quantitative research on its effects is limited (Dick 1994, Thurston 1997, Lee et al. 2005).  A key 
reason for the paucity of research is timing:  the PHCA legislation was passed in 1974, five years 
before any national survey provided information on health insurance coverage for individuals, 
making it difficult to compare outcomes before and after the passage of the law.  While the early 
passage of the PHCA creates significant research hurdles, it does not preclude a meaningful  
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analysis of the law’s impact.  As we show later, because ESI coverage was relatively stable in 
Hawaii while it declined in other states over the past few decades, the coverage gap between 
Hawaii and other states widened over time, particularly for worker groups with low rates of ESI 
coverage.  This divergence in coverage, combined with substantial growth in the relative price of 
health care over the same period, implies that the cost of complying with the mandate has grown 
over time.  As a result, data pre-dating the original PHCA legislation is not necessary for testing 
the hypothesis that the mandate has had labor market effects.  
  In this paper we use Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the years 1979 to 2005 to 
compare trends in health insurance coverage and three labor market outcomes—wages, hours, 
and employment—between Hawaii and the rest of the United States.  Compared with previous 
work, our analysis is the first to  account for the prediction that the effects of Hawaii’s mandate 
should be strongest for workers who are unlikely to receive health benefits in a voluntary 
market—primarily low-skill workers—and should be minimal for workers with high rates of ESI 
coverage in the absence of a mandate.  Ours is also the first study to analyze the complete range 
of predicted outcomes in a “difference-in-differences” setting:  we use repeated cross-sections 
from the CPS to compare changes over time in ESI coverage, alternative sources of coverage, 
and labor market outcomes between Hawaii and the rest of the nation, conditional on an 
extensive set of control variables. 
Given the likely influence of unobserved effects at the state level, we take a conservative 
approach to statistical inference by relying on a variant of Fisher’s (1935) permutation test.  Our 
tests entail comparisons of the usual difference in conditional means between the United States 
and Hawaii to parallel “placebo” comparisons between each of the other 50 states (plus DC) and 
the remainder of the United States.  We find that by this metric Hawaii has an unusually high  
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fraction of individuals with ESI coverage compared with other states, and this gap has grown 
over time for groups with low coverage rates, consistent with the expected effects of the 
mandate.  Using the same framework, we find that the increase in ESI coverage was mirrored by 
a similar decline in insurance coverage through public sources (e.g., Medicaid).  We also 
uncover a rising tendency for Hawaiian employers to rely on part-time positions that are exempt 
from the law.  Like the coverage results, the effects on part-time work are concentrated on 
workers with low probabilities of receiving health benefits in the absence of an employer 
mandate.  By contrast, we find that Hawaii’s distribution of wages and employment has not 
diverged significantly from that in other states. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
II.A.  Hawaii’s Health Insurance Mandate 
  Hawaii’s employer mandate legislation (PHCA) was passed in 1974, the same year that 
the U.S. Congress passed ERISA, which established Federal regulation of employer-sponsored 
benefit programs.  ERISA preempts state laws and has been interpreted by the courts as 
prohibiting state laws mandating that employers provide health insurance benefits (Mariner 
1992).  Shortly after it took effect in January of 1975, the PHCA was successfully challenged on 
ERISA grounds; this decision was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1980 and by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1981.  In 1983, the U.S. Congress granted a permanent ERISA exemption to 
PHCA.  Because that legislation specified that substantive changes to PHCA would void the 
exemption, the law has been largely unchanged since then (Oliver 2004). 
  The PHCA requires all private-sector employers in Hawaii to provide health insurance to 
employees working 20 or more hours per week.  Non-complying employers face financial  
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sanctions and can be shut down after 30 days.  In addition to low-hours employees, exemptions 
also apply to new hires (employed less than four weeks), seasonal employees, commission-only 
workers, and “low-wage” employees.
1  Employers must pay at least 50% of the premium cost, 
and the employee contribution is limited to an amount that is no greater than 1.5% of their 
wages.  Qualifying health insurance plans are required to contain certain minimal benefits, 
including inpatient hospital coverage, emergency room care, maternity care, and medical and 
surgical services.  
  Available evidence suggests that the legal uncertainty surrounding PHCA’s status limited 
the law’s impact between its 1975 enactment and the Federal intervention in 1983.  One estimate 
is that after the law went into effect, private insurance enrollment increased by no more than 
5,000 individuals, slightly less than one percent of the state’s working-age population (Friedman 
1993, p. 54).
2  Moreover, the state suspended employer compliance audits between the first court 
ruling in 1977 and exhaustion of the state’s judicial appeals in 1981 (Agsalud 1982, p. 14).  On 
the other hand, as we show in Section IV, conditional on observable factors, ESI coverage was 
already higher in Hawaii than it was in most other states during this early period.  This gap 
widened after 1983, which is important for our empirical framework. 
II.B. The Economics of Employer Mandated Health Insurance 
  Summers (1989) showed how the labor market effects of an employer benefit mandate 
can be analyzed using a simple supply and demand framework.  In his analysis, a mandate causes 
the labor demand curve to shift back and the labor supply curve to shift out, causing wages to 
fall.  The magnitude of the wage change, and the effect on hours and employment, will depend 
                                                 
1  Low-wage workers are defined as those with monthly earnings less than 86.67 times the legislated 
minimum hourly wage.   
2 The U.S. GAO (1994, p. 16) also noted limited enrollment increases after the mandate took effect.   
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on how workers’ valuation of the benefit compares with employers’ cost of provision. 
  In the absence of any pre-existing market failures, the benefit will be voluntarily provided 
to workers whose valuation exceeds employers’ cost.  Therefore, such workers should not be 
directly affected by a mandate.  Instead, the most important effects of a mandate will be on 
workers who would not otherwise receive the benefit, either because their valuation falls short of 
its cost or because their wage is close to the minimum wage and therefore cannot be reduced 
enough to offset the cost of the benefit.  Thus, the effects of the mandate on ESI coverage should 
be largest for low-wage, low-skill workers, who generally exhibit low rates of coverage in a 
voluntary market.  Some of this increase in coverage may be offset by declines in coverage 
provided to working spouses.
3  In addition, increases in ESI coverage among low-wage workers 
may offset coverage through public sources such as Medicaid. 
For workers most affected by the mandate, whose valuation of ESI falls short of its cost, 
the wage reduction arising from the market adjustment to the mandate will fall short of the cost 
of the benefit.  Employers will therefore face incentives to substitute exempt for covered 
workers.  If this type of adjustment is not sufficient to offset the remaining costs of the mandate, 
relative labor costs rise for covered workers and employers may act to reduce employment of 
these workers.  We test for such effects in our empirical section, focusing on worker groups 
whose ESI coverage rates rose by the largest amount in response to the mandate. 
 II.C.  Past Research on Hawaii’s Mandate  
  Any analysis of the PHCA must begin by estimating the law’s effect on insurance 
coverage.  Several prior studies used cross-sectional data to compare insurance coverage in 
                                                 
3The PHCA requires employers to cover a large share of the premiums for employees but imposes weaker 
requirements regarding contributions for dependent coverage.  As a result, the out-of-pocket cost to 
employees of adding dependents is not necessarily lower in Hawaii than in other states, and married 
workers may face incentives to receive own ESI coverage rather than coverage as a dependent.   
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Hawaii and the rest of the nation, with mixed results.  Based on a cross-section analysis of 
Current Population Survey (CPS) data from the mid-1980s, Dick (1994) concluded that the 
PHCA did not raise insurance coverage rates in Hawaii relative to other states.  However, the 
other studies, which used CPS data from later years in a cross-sectional framework, found that 
ESI coverage was significantly higher in Hawaii and attributed this result to the PHCA (Thurston 
1997, Lee et al. 2005).  Differences in data and research design make it difficult to reconcile 
these divergent results.
4   
  To the extent that the PHCA prevented employers in Hawaii from dropping coverage in 
response to rising premiums, as was observed for the nation as a whole over the past few 
decades, we should expect to see adjustments along other margins, such as wages, hours, or 
employment.  The existing literature provides limited evidence on these labor market effects.  
Thurston (1997) investigated the wage effects of Hawaii’s mandate using data from the 1970 and 
1990 Censuses aggregated to the industry level (with ESI coverage measured in 1990 only).  He 
found mixed evidence for wage reductions due to the expansion of ESI, with results that are 
highly sensitive to assumptions regarding counterfactual wage trends. 
Thurston also tested for an effect on part-time work, again using aggregated industry data 
from the 1970 and 1990 Censuses.  His comparisons across industries based on ESI coverage in 
1990 provided weak evidence in favor of the claim that the percentage of workers with low hours 
increased more in Hawaii than in the rest of the United States.  In addition to the inability to 
identify changes in ESI coverage over time, a further limitation of his analysis is that the 
measures of “low hours” work consistently available in his data used weekly hours cut-offs of 15 
                                                 
4 Relying on anecdotal evidence, some analysts have argued that the passage of PHCA had little immediate 
effect, but once the law was in place it slowed the erosion of employment based coverage as health care 
costs rose, leading to growing differences between Hawaii and other states over time (Neubauer 1993; U.S. 
GAO 1994).  Our results discussed in subsequent sections are consistent with this.    
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and 30 hours, which are different than the 20 hour cut-off that defines coverage by the PHCA.  
Lee et al.’s cross-sectional analysis also provided suggestive evidence that employers in Hawaii 
are more likely to employ workers on low-hour schedules.   
Much of the discussion and critique of employer mandates has centered on their potential 
negative effects on employment.  Several papers argued that for workers near the minimum 
wage, an employer mandate will have effects similar to an increase in the minimum wage 
(Yelowitz 2003; Baicker and Levy 2007; Burkhauser and Simon 2007).  However, neither these 
studies nor the prior studies on Hawaii’s PHCA tested whether the law had such a 
disemployment effect.  Compared with the analyses we conduct below, none of the existing 
studies of Hawaii’s PHCA tested for the expected differential impacts of the mandate across 
worker groups or investigated changes over time arising from the rising costs of compliance. 
 
III.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
III. A.  Sample Construction 
Our main analyses rely on annual data from the CPS March and Monthly Outgoing 
Rotation Group (MORG) files.
5  We constructed repeated cross-sections for years starting with 
the availability of health insurance questions in the March survey in 1980 and continuing through 
the mid-2000s (survey years 1980-2006, which correspond to the reference years of 1979-2005, 
the same as in our MORG files).  Unless otherwise indicated we focus on workers age 18-64 
who are employed in the private sector (excluding the self employed); we exclude government 
                                                 
5 The March CPS provides information on ESI and other sources of health insurance coverage during the 
prior calendar year.  For the analysis of labor market outcomes, we use the MORG files, which provide 
data on earnings and hours in their main job at the time of the survey.  Compared with the March data, the 
MORG provides larger sample sizes and is not subject to the recall bias that may affect the retrospective 
data from the March survey.    
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employees because Hawaii’s PHCA law does not apply to them and their inclusion could bias 
the cross-state comparisons (with the exception of their use in falsification tests, as described 
below).  In our analyses of wages and hours, we exclude observations with imputed values of 
those variables.  Additional details regarding the characteristics of our data files, variable 
definitions, and treatment of imputed and top-coded data are provided in Appendix A.  Mean 
values of population and job variables for Hawaii and the rest of the U.S. are shown in Appendix 
B, Table B1 (not for publication; will be made available online).
6  
III.B. Rising Costs of the PHCA:  ESI Premiums and Coverage 
  In considering the possible labor market effects of the PHCA, it is important to recognize  
that the burden of the mandate increased over time as the growth in health insurance premiums 
outstripped growth in prices and wages more generally.  While employers in the rest of the 
nation also experienced rising insurance costs, unlike Hawaiian employers, they can avoid the 
rising costs by dropping ESI coverage.
7   
Figure 1 provides a sense of how the cost of the PHCA to employers has grown.  The 
graph plots real ($2005) single coverage health insurance premiums in Hawaii expressed as an 
hourly cost for a full-time worker for the years 1974 to 2005.
8  In 1974, the monthly single 
                                                 
6 Small differences are evident between Hawaii and other states.  In regard to demographics, Hawaii’s 
population is somewhat more educated on average than the population in other states, and it has a very high 
share of individuals whose race/ethnicity is Asian/Pacific Islander (subsumed in “Other” in the table, for 
consistency over our sample frame).  Hawaii’s population was much less urban than the national average 
early in our sample frame but more urban at the end.  Regarding industry characteristics, manufacturing 
accounts for a smaller share of employment in Hawaii than the rest of the United States, though this 
difference has declined over time.  The gap in manufacturing is largely offset by a higher percentage of 
Hawaiian employment in personal services (which includes hotels and tourism).  
7 An analysis by the U.S. GAO (1994) concluded that from 1975 to 1993 health spending grew by similar 
amounts in Hawaii and the rest of the country.  However, data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-
Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) show that ESI premiums grew less rapidly in Hawaii than nationwide 
after 1996, for single and family coverage. 
8 The premium data are from the Hawaii Medical Service Association (HMSA), the largest private insurer 
in Hawaii, and they correspond to the most popular plan sold to groups of 100 or fewer.    
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coverage premium for a plan meeting the standards of the PHCA was $15.96, which for an 
employee working 40 hours per week (assuming 4.3 weeks per month) translated to a cost of 9 
cents per hour in current dollars, or 36 cents in 2005 dollars.  The cost per hour was only slightly 
higher in 1979, the first year in our data set, but then increased steadily thereafter.  By 2005 the 
monthly premium was $246, or $1.43 per hour for a full-time employee, more than three times 
the real cost in 1980.  The cumulative increase in the inflation-adjusted costs of insurance 
coverage over our sample frame ($1.07 per hour worked) dwarfs the cost of providing health 
insurance at the time the law was passed in 1975 ($0.38 per hour) and when it was permanently 
authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1983 ($0.60 per hour).  This implies that our strategy of 
examining cumulative changes over time is likely to dominate the alternative strategy based on 
before/after comparisons (which is not possible using available individual data in any event). 
To complement the discussion of rising health insurance costs, we now turn to a 
descriptive comparison of trends in health insurance coverage in Hawaii and the rest of the 
United States.  Figure 2 displays data on the percentage of private sector workers who received 
health insurance coverage through their own employer, for the years 1979 to 2005.  Panel A 
displays the series for all workers, with separate lines indicating the series for Hawaii, the 
remainder of the United States, and the difference between them.  At the beginning of the sample 
frame the unadjusted coverage rate in Hawaii is about 4 percentage points above that in the rest 
of the country.  Over time, the gap rises, as the coverage rate is largely maintained in Hawaii (at 
about 68%) but falls elsewhere.  At the end of the sample frame, the ESI coverage rate was about 
14 percentage points higher in Hawaii (68% vs. 54% for the years 2004-05).
9  
                                                 
9 It may seem surprising that the coverage rate in Hawaii is well below 100 percent, given that there are 
few exemptions to the PHCA.  We investigated this issue by conducting supplemental tabulations using 
establishment level data on insurance offers from the MEPS-IC and worker level data on eligibility and  
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  As noted earlier, the basic supply and demand theory predicts that the effect of an 
employer mandate on health insurance coverage should be greatest for workers who have low 
rates of ESI coverage in the absence of a mandate, such as less skilled workers, and should have 
little effect on workers who have a high probability of receiving ESI in a voluntary market.  A 
simple way to test this prediction is to divide the sample by educational attainment.  Panels B 
and C of Figure 2 display own ESI coverage rates for workers with a high school degree or less 
and a college degree or more (workers with some college but no degree are excluded from these 
samples).  The results are consistent with our expectations.  The rising ESI coverage gap 
between Hawaii and the rest of the nation is largely confined to the low education sample.  For 
that sample, the coverage gap between Hawaii and the rest of the country rose from about 3 
percentage points in 1979-1980 to about 19 percentage points in 2004-05.  By contrast, for 
college educated workers, Hawaii’s ESI coverage gap shifted from positive to negative across 
different sub-periods, but it was around 3-4 percentage points at the start and periods of the 
sample frame, suggesting little impact of Hawaii’s mandate for this group.  
  The combination of a large cumulative increase in ESI premium costs and a rising 
coverage gap between Hawaii and other states implies that the PHCA mandate has become 
increasingly costly to private-sector employers in Hawaii and therefore may have discernible 
labor market effects.  Testing this proposition more formally requires a statistical conditioning 




                                                                                                                                                             
take-up from the CPS Contingent Worker Supplements; these data confirmed that most of this gap is 
accounted for by workers who decline coverage or are not eligible.  
  11
IV.  ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
IV. A.  Permutation Tests 
The descriptive results discussed in the preceding section suggest that the ESI coverage 
gap between Hawaii and other states rose over our sample frame, particularly for low-skilled 
workers.  We are interested in testing more formally whether ESI coverage increased over time 
in Hawaii relative to other states and also in testing for corresponding changes in labor market 
outcomes.  We take a difference-in-differences approach that compares changes in ESI coverage 
and labor market outcomes in Hawaii to changes in the same outcomes in other states.  Our 
estimates are derived from cross-sectional regressions run for the baseline period of 1979-1982 
(when the legal status of Hawaii’s PPHCA legislation was in dispute) and a later period.  Since 
we are interested in the long run effects of the law, our analyses focus on the most recent set of 
years in our data extract (2002-2005) as the comparison period, though as a robustness test we 
experiment with other comparison periods.  We estimate separate regressions for the two time 
periods rather than a single model with an interaction term, in order to allow for unrestricted 
effects of the covariates over time.  Also, we pool multiple years in order to ensure adequate 
sample sizes for reliable estimation of the Hawaii effect.  For each of the periods the model is: 
 
 Y ist = Xist
t + Zst
t+Hit δ
t+ φst + ηit,      (t = 0, 1)  (1) 
  
These equations are estimated using individual data from the CPS files.  In addition to the 
time period indicator t in equation (1), i indexes individuals and s indexes states.  The dependent 
variables Y that we analyze are:  from the March CPS files, indicators of health insurance 
coverage (own-name ESI as well as alternative sources, as described below); and from the CPS  
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MORG files, hourly wages, an indicator for working less than 20 hours per week (the hours cut-
off determining PHCA coverage), and an indicator for employment.  Equations for the indicator 
variables are estimated as logits, because some of the outcomes that we examine have means that 
are close to zero in our sample (e.g., low hours work and coverage through public insurance);  
for these equations, the key coefficients converted into percentage-point changes in the 
probability of the observed outcome (discussed in more detail in Section V.A).  The equation for 
hourly wages is estimated as a log-linear regression.   
For all outcomes we condition on individual (X) and state-level (Z) covariates; φst and ηit 
are an unobserved state effect and an i.i.d. disturbance, discussed in more detail below.
10  Our 
focus is on the dummy variable H, which indicates whether an individual is living in Hawaii.  
The difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of Hawaii’s PHCA law is given by the 
difference between the Hawaii effect in the comparison and baseline periods, or  = 
1 – 
0. 
While estimation is straightforward in this setting, statistical inference is not.  As 
Moulton (1990) demonstrates, assuming that the disturbances are i.i.d. (by ignoring the state 
effect φst) leads to insufficiently conservative inference.  In response to this concern, using the 
well-known “clustering” framework, inference relies on the asymptotic approximations 
                                                 
10 The individual controls (X) are education (5 categories), a quartic in age, gender, gender by age quartic 
interactions, married, married by gender interaction, race/ethnicity (4 categories), residence in an urban 
area, and veteran status.  In the ESI, wage, and hours regressions (but not the alternative coverage and 
employment regressions) we control for industry and occupation (13 and 11 categories, respectively).  The 
state-level variables (Z) are annual measures of private sector union density, the state minimum wage, and 
the log change in the state Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Controlling for the minimum wage is 
important because its level is relatively high in Hawaii.  State GDP is an important control because 
Hawaii’s tourism-dependent economy is subject to shocks that can be independent of national economic 
conditions (e.g., a prolonged slump in the state caused by a sharp drop in Japanese tourism, which lasted 
for much of the 1990s). We include the state level union variable—obtained from Hirsch, MacPherson and 
Vroman (2001 and online)—because individual-level union membership is not available in the March CPS.  
Union membership is a strong predictor of ESI coverage (Buchmueller, DiNardo and Valletta 2002) and 
throughout our sample frame Hawaii’s union density exceeds that of other states.   
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associated with the assumption that the number of individuals within a state and/or the number of 
states grows large (Wooldridge 2006).  This assumption does not apply in our setting, due to our 
focus on a single state.  Moreover, some researchers have argued that inference is extremely 
problematic and perhaps impossible in such settings, because the comparison of a single state 
with all others collapses the degrees of freedom in the model and creates much larger sampling 
variance than is captured by the conventional asymptotic framework (Donald and Lang 2007).  
As noted by Wooldridge (2006), however, this argument is indistinguishable from the standard 
question of whether an observed conditional difference in measured outcomes is entirely due to 
the policy change of interest. 
To address such concerns about our reliance on a single state as our experimental unit, we 
implement a variant of Fisher’s (1935) permutation or randomization test.  Our approach starts 
with estimation of equation (1) for both time periods using OLS.  Instead of comparing this 
estimate of  to its asymptotic standard error obtained using conventional means, we compare 
our estimate to the 50 “placebo” estimates obtained by running 50 additional regressions for each 
time period and re-computing Δ, in each case replacing H with an indicator for one of the other 
49 states or DC.  The test statistic for the null hypothesis that the change for Hawaii is no 
different from the change for other states is formed by computing the percentile that  represents 
in the distribution of the placebo estimates.  In other words, we treat the 50 placebo estimates as 
the sampling distribution for Δ.
11  This yields p-values for the hypothesis that the treatment effect 
of Hawaii’s PPHCA is different from zero.  The resulting hypothesis tests are based on much 
                                                 
11  For a more detailed discussion of this approach, see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, section 4.2).  For a 
recent application in a setting similar to ours (policy effects in a single state), see Abadie et al. (2009).  
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more conservative and appropriate confidence intervals than those produced using the standard 
clustering alternative.
12   
IV. B.  Accounting for Heterogeneous Policy Effects 
  As noted earlier, the basic supply and demand theory predicts that the effect of an 
employer mandate on health insurance coverage should be greatest for workers who place a low 
value on health insurance and therefore have low rates of ESI coverage in the absence of a 
mandate, such as younger, less skilled workers, and should have little effect on workers who 
have a high probability of receiving ESI in a voluntary market.  The results in Figure 2, which 
stratifies the data by education, are broadly consistent with this prediction.  We can account for 
heterogeneous policy effects more precisely by using a full range of explanatory variables to 
categorize individuals according to their probability of receiving health benefits in a voluntary 
market.  To do this we fit the following regression on the complete sample of observations 
excluding those in Hawaii, using a logit model estimated separately for each year of data: 
 
  Iist = Xist
t+ Zst
t+ it (2) 
 
In (2), I is an indicator variable for own-name ESI coverage, X and Z are the same controls as in 
equation (1), and i, s, and t index individuals, states, and year.  Using the results of these 
regressions, we fit the probability of ESI coverage for each individual in the full sample 
(including Hawaii) and then sort the fitted probabilities and place individuals into quintiles of 
this distribution (separately for each year).  While education plays an important role in this 
                                                 
12 Our placebo estimates suggest important violations of the assumptions required for the usual clustered 
standard errors to be appropriate.  For example, for some outcomes we investigate below, reliance on 
clustered standard errors would imply that virtually all of the placebo estimates are statistically significant 
at conventional levels.  
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prediction equation, other variables are important predictors as well (see Appendix C, intended 
for the online version; it lists the results from the ESI equations discussed in the next section).
13 
 
V. RESULTS: INSURANCE COVERAGE 
V.A. Employer-Sponsored Insurance Coverage 
In Table 1 we list the regression-adjusted difference in own name ESI coverage between 
Hawaii and other states for the initial period (
0) in Panel A, the later period (
1) in Panel B, and 
the difference between these two estimates () in Panel C.  For these numerical estimates and 
subsequent results from logit equations, the estimated Hawaii coefficient δ (and placebo 
coefficients) are converted into “Population Average Treatment Effects on the Treated” (PATT, 
using the terminology of Imbens and Wooldridge 2009), expressed in percentage terms.  These 
represent the percentage-point change in the probability of the observed outcome arising from 
residence in Hawaii (or a placebo state), conditional on other covariates, using the state-specific 
distribution of covariates for the calculation.
14 
                                                 
13 This approach relates closely to that of Card (1996), who used predictions from a wage equation 
estimated for non-union workers to examine how the union wage effect varies by skill level.   In the 
statistics literature, such an approach to characterizing “treatment effect heterogeneity” has been called a 
“prognostic score” (Hansen 2008). 
14 For example, the calculation of the PATT (in percentage-point terms) for a specific estimate of the 
Hawaii effect δ is: 
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The       refer to the fitted logit probabilities (based on equation 1) for a specific individual i, with the 
coefficient on the Hawaii indicator included (H=1) or excluded (H=0).  The PATT is the difference 
between these fitted probabilities averaged across the complete set of Hawaii observations used in the 
regression, with observations for other states excluded from the calculation; NH is the number of Hawaii 
observations.  A similar procedure is followed to obtain the PATTs for the placebo estimates.  Compared 
with the alternative calculation based on the entire sample in each case (the “PATE” in Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009), the PATT relies on the state-specific covariate values (      1   ).    
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For estimates of the Hawaii effect in Table 1, we list the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of the 
distribution of placebo estimates.  In our framework, these values represent the lower and upper 
critical values for rejecting the null hypothesis that the Hawaii effect is zero, with the 
significance level of the two-sided test set to 10 percent.
15  Figure 3 provides a graphical 
illustration of the same results by showing Hawaii’s position in the full distributions of placebo 
effects (plotted as histograms).  Similar to Table 1, we report results for the two time periods as 
well as the estimated differences, once again separately identifying the Hawaii value (the solid 
line) and the 5th and 95th percentile critical values (dashed lines).   
Regarding emphasis on the 10 percent level for the test, recall that the significance level 
is determined by the rank of the Hawaii effect in the distribution of placebo effects.  With 50 
placebo estimates (49 states plus DC), achieving 10 percent significance requires that the Hawaii 
effect be ranked second from the top or bottom of the placebo distribution, while 5 percent 
significance requires that the Hawaii effect be ranked at the top or bottom.
16  Because our 
placebo framework yields conservative confidence bounds, we emphasize the 10 percent 
significance level in the displays rather than the more common 5 percent level.  In the tables, we 
also identify estimates that are significant at the 5 percent level, using conventional labels; in the 
figures, estimates that achieve 5 percent significance are identified by their position outside the 
span of the placebo histogram. 
Turning to the results, recall from Figure 2 that in the early years of our data the 
percentage of private sector workers with ESI coverage was only about 4 percentage points 
                                                 
15 For comparison purposes and also completeness, Appendix C reports results for the complete set of 
coefficients for the 2002-05 sub-sample regression, with conventional clustered standard errors listed. 
16 More precisely, ranking in the second position from the top or bottom implies 8 percent significance, 
while top or bottom ranking implies 4 percent significance.  We have rounded up to the more common 10 
percent and 5 percent levels.  
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higher in Hawaii compared with other states.  When we adjust for covariates, the difference rises 
substantially, to about 14 percentage points for the full sample (top left of Table 1 and Figure 3).  
This indicates that the distribution of covariates in Hawaii was consistent with lower coverage 
rates than in other states.  The conditional coverage gap had risen somewhat by the end of our 
sample frame (2002-2005), to about 18 percentage points.   
The breakdown by quintiles in Table 1 and Figure 3 indicates that the Hawaii effect is 
particularly large for the lower quintiles, representing worker types with low coverage 
probabilities in a voluntary market; the difference between Hawaii and other states ranges up to 
28 percentage points for the lowest quintile in 2002-05, which represents more than a doubling 
of coverage relative to baseline rates for this group in other states (around 20 percent).  In both 
time periods, except for the fifth quintile, the Hawaii effect lies beyond or near the boundary of 
the placebo distribution, implying a high degree of statistical significance according to our 
placebo testing criterion.  For the first four quintiles, Hawaii is ranked at the top in nearly every 
case, indicating that the “Hawaii effect” is significant at the 5 percent level.   
The key results for our difference-in-differences tests are the change effects (estimates of 
Δ) displayed in the third panel of Table 1 and third column of Figure 3.  For worker types with 
low coverage rates, in the first two quintiles of predicted coverage, the Hawaii gap grew 
substantially between 1979-82 and 2002-05.  The increase ranged from 7 to 10 percentage points 
and was larger in the second quintile, representing a near doubling of the conditional coverage 
gap (from 13 to 23 percentage points).  For each of these quintiles, the increase in the Hawaii 
effect is significant at the 10 percent level using our placebo criterion, and nearly significant at 
the 5 percent level.  In particular, the Hawaii effect is ranked second among the distribution of 
placebo estimates, slightly behind Massachusetts in the first quintile and Delaware in the second.   
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These large Hawaii effects in the first two quintiles contribute to an effect for the full sample 
(first row) that is ranked towards the top of the distribution; the increase for Hawaii is about 4.1 
percentage points, which ranks sixth, about 1.75 percentage points below the two top-ranked 
states.  In contrast, for the top three quintiles the change in the Hawaii effect is smaller in 
magnitude and lies towards the middle of the placebo distribution, implying that for higher skill 
workers there was no statistically significant change in the coverage gap between Hawaii and 
other states.  Overall, these results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that the law 
should raise relative ESI coverage in Hawaii versus other states for worker types with low rates 
of ESI coverage in the voluntary market (i.e., the bottom ESI quintiles). 
V.B.  Insurance Coverage from Other Sources 
  Although own-name ESI coverage is the outcome that should be most directly affected 
by an employer mandate, these effects may be offset by indirect effects on other sources of 
coverage.  We examine that possibility here.  Figure 4 displays results from regressions that are 
similar to the own ESI runs from Figure 3, incorporating the two other insurance outcomes that 
are consistently available across our sample frame: coverage as a dependent through a family 
member’s ESI plan and coverage through public sources.
17  For brevity, we only display the 
estimates for changes over time.  The first column presents results for ESI coverage through 
either source (own or dependent), and the subsequent two columns list results for dependent ESI 
and public insurance.
18  Following the full sample results in the first row, subsequent rows 
                                                 
17 Public insurance consists primarily of Medicare, Medicaid, and programs for military veterans.  We 
exclude overlapping coverage from the definitions:  individuals with own and dependent coverage are 
recorded as having own ESI only, and individuals are identified as having public coverage if that is their 
sole source of coverage.  The data on alternative coverage sources are discussed further in Appendix A. 
18 According to our measures, across the years in our data about 15 to 17 percent of the sample have ESI as 
a dependent and about 6 to 8 percent have coverage through public insurance; the latter numbers are low  
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displays results for quintiles that reflect fitted probabilities of own ESI coverage, formed in the 
same manner as for Figure 3. 
  The results displayed in Figure 4 are suggestive of declines in alternative coverage 
sources—primarily public coverage—that offset rising own ESI coverage in Hawaii.  In the first 
quintile, the significant increase in the Hawaii effect on own ESI coverage (Figure 3, second 
row, final column) is partially offset by a small, statistically insignificant decline in ESI as a 
dependent (Figure 4, second column, second row), yielding a statistically insignificant 5.8 
percentage-point increase in overall ESI coverage for this quintile in Hawaii (Figure 4, first 
column, second row).  By contrast, for the second quintile, the increase in own ESI in Hawaii 
(Figure 3) is not offset by a decline in ESI as a dependent, and the 10.4 percentage-point increase 
in overall ESI coverage in Hawaii is significant at nearly the 5% level.  In general, the Hawaii 
effect on the change in dependent coverage (Figure 4, second column) is highly insignificant 
according to our placebo criterion, with the exception of an anomalous result for the fourth 
quintile, for which the Hawaii effect is negative and significant at the 10 percent level.
19   
The results in the third column of Figure 4 indicate that coverage through public sources 
declined in Hawaii relative to other states, primarily in the first two quintiles, offsetting the rise 
in own ESI coverage in those quintiles.  The Hawaii effects are negative and significant at just 
below the 10 percent level in the first two quintiles (ranked third from the bottom of the placebo 
distribution, close behind the required second rank).  In the first quintile, the decline in the 
Hawaii effect on public coverage is 7.1 percentage points, which is large relative to the average 
                                                                                                                                                             
relative to published figures because our sample of 18-64 year old workers excludes the groups most likely 
to receive public coverage (the elderly, children, and non-workers).     
19 Thurston (1997) found that dependent coverage was lower in Hawaii than in the nation, although his 
reliance on cross-section data (years 1990-93) for this analysis precludes inferring a causal link from the 
mandate.  
  20
public coverage rate of about 33 percent in this quintile.  It is essentially identical to the 
estimated increase in own ESI coverage for this quintile, implying that the increase in own ESI 
was exactly offset by a decline in public coverage. 
Overall, the alternative coverage results in Figure 4 indicate that the rise in own ESI for 
the first two quintiles (from Figure 3 and Table 1) was largely offset by declines in ESI from 
public sources, possibly accompanied by some reductions in dependent coverage that may 
reduce the cost burden of the mandate.  These results help to explain the divergence among prior 
studies.  Dick’s (1994) conclusion that the PHCA had a minimal impact on insurance coverage 
was based on analysis of health insurance from any source, whereas Thurston (1997) and Lee et 
al. (2005) focused on own-name ESI. 
V.C.  Robustness and Falsification Tests 
  In this section, we discuss the results of several alternative data cuts, which help assess 
the robustness of our ESI coverage results and also provide falsification tests.  We describe the 
results briefly here; the displays are contained in Appendix B, which is not intended for 
publication but will appear in an expanded online version of the paper.  
  Our analysis has focused on the long-run effects of Hawaii’s PPHCA legislation, through 
a comparison between the start and end periods of our data (1979-82 and 2002-05).  To examine 
the sensitivity of our results to the specific periods chosen, Figure B1 provides an analysis of 
own ESI coverage parallel to that in Table 3, but with two alternative, intermediate time periods:  
1979-82 vs. 1990-93, and 1990-93 vs. 2002-05.  For brevity, we only display the results for 
changes over time.  The results largely confirm the significant Hawaii effect for the first and 
second quintiles from Figure 3, although the sub-period breakdown in Figure B1 shows that the  
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increase was most pronounced during the second sub-period for the first quintile and the first 
sub-period for the second quintile.  
In addition to health insurance benefits, we also examined conditional trends in pension 
benefits.  Examination of pensions serves as a falsification test for the effects of the PHCA 
mandate.  If the increase in ESI coverage was accompanied by an increase in pension coverage, 
this would suggest that rising ESI was due to unobserved factors affecting employment benefits 
in Hawaii in general, rather than a direct effect of the PHCA.   
We conducted permutation tests analogous to the ESI tests for two separate pension 
variables, indicating whether a workers’ employer offers a pension to any of its employees, and 
whether the individual worker is covered by a pension plan (see Appendix A for additional 
details regarding these variables).  The results are displayed in Appendix B (Figure B2); as 
before, and for brevity, we only display the change estimates (Δ).
20  These results show that 
based on our placebo criterion, there was no increase in relative pension offers or coverage in 
Hawaii over our sample frame:  the Hawaii effect generally is small and near the middle of the 
placebo distribution, or negative in some cases.  The absence of an increase in pension 
availability and coverage suggests that the increase in ESI coverage in Hawaii (Figure 3) was 
likely due to the mandate rather than unobserved effects that increased benefit receipt in general. 
  Our preceding analyses have focused on private-sector workers, excluding government 
employees because Hawaii’s mandate does not apply to them.  As such, testing for a Hawaii 
effect on the change in ESI coverage for government employees constitutes a additional 
                                                 
20 For this analysis, we formed the quintile groupings based on the fitted probabilities of pension offers and 
coverage.  Separate runs indicated that the results are indistinguishable from those reported here when the 
quintiles are instead formed using fitted probabilities of ESI coverage instead.  
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falsification test of our finding that the law increased coverage:  if the Hawaii effect is caused by 
the mandate, we should not find a similar Hawaii effect for government employees.   
The results of this test for government employees are displayed in Appendix B (Figure 
B3).
21  The figure is constructed analogously to Figure 3, with the two sub-periods and change 
results displayed in three columns.  On average, the point estimates indicate that government 
employees in Hawaii have slightly higher coverage rates than do government employees 
elsewhere.  However, the Hawaii effect in general is statistically insignificant according to our 
placebo criterion.  Moreover, the only significant increase over time is found for the fifth 
quintile, due to a large negative Hawaii effect in the initial sample period.  This finding appears 
to reflect random elements in the data and does not falsify our private-sector ESI results because 
the mandate is not expected to affect the upper quintiles of the predicted ESI coverage 
distribution.  On balance, these results for government employees do not falsify the findings 
regarding rising ESI coverage for private-sector employees. 
 
VI.  RESULTS: LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES 
  Figure 1 showed that Hawaiian employers’ cost of providing health insurance rose 
significantly over our sample frame.  In addition, the ESI results in Table 1 and Figure 3 showed 
that by comparison with other states, own coverage rose significantly in Hawaii for workers 
whose characteristics are consistent with low rates of coverage in an unconstrained labor market.  
Combined, these sets of results indicate that Hawaii’s mandate created rising costs over time for 
employers who hire such workers.  Figure 4 showed that some of these costs may have been 
                                                 
21 The quintiles were formed as before but based on the probability of ESI coverage for government 
employees only; industry and occupation variables were excluded from the list of controls.  
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offset by slight declines in coverage as an ESI dependent, particularly in the first ESI quintile, 
implying that the overall mandate costs may be small.   
Assuming net positive costs of the mandate, our demand-supply framework from Section 
II.B highlights three likely labor market effects.  First, to the extent that employers are able to 
pass the cost of the mandate on to workers, wage growth for affected workers should be lower in 
Hawaii than in other states.  If the wage offset is incomplete, perhaps because of a binding 
minimum wage, the mandate may affect labor demand by raising the cost of employing less 
skilled workers.  One potential response is that employers may increase their reliance on part-
time workers who are exempt from the mandate.  Alternatively, firms may hire fewer workers 
from the available labor force, thereby reducing employment probabilities for worker groups 
most likely to be affected by the mandate.   
  Results for all three labor market outcomes are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 5.  For 
brevity, we report only the results for the difference-in-differences parameter (Δ); for each 
outcome, the full regression results for the most recent sample period are listed in Appendix C 
(intended for the online version).   
VI.A. Wages 
Before turning to our empirical estimates of relative wage changes, it is useful to consider 
what constitutes a plausible wage effect of Hawaii’s mandate.  We assess this by calculating the 
difference effect Δ that we would expect to estimate if the growing costs of the mandate for 
employers were fully offset by an equivalent reduction in wages.  We set the cost of the mandate 
equal to the own-ESI coverage differential between Hawaii and the rest of the United States 
multiplied by the full cost of ESI coverage in Hawaii.  We focus on the second ESI quintile, 
because it exhibits the largest effect on own ESI coverage and combined own and dependent  
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coverage in Figures 3 and 4.  The calculations were performed under the assumption that 
employers pay 85% of the full direct costs of workers’ health insurance in Hawaii and 80% of 
the direct costs in other states.
22  The implied decline in relative wages between the baseline 
(1979-82) and comparison (2002-05) periods equals 1.6 percent.  This represents a very small 
change in the observed wage gap over our lengthy sample frame, and as such it is unlikely to be 
detectable with acceptable statistical precision using our placebo criterion. 
  The estimated state effects for wages in difference form are displayed in the first column 
of Figure 5 and the top panel of Table 2; the wage regressions were estimated with the log hourly 
wage as the dependent variable, and the estimated state effects were translated into percentage 
effects on wages using the standard transformation of the coefficient on a dummy variable in a 
semi-log equation.  The results indicate that wages on average fell slightly (about 3%) in Hawaii 
relative to other states over our sample frame (first row, full sample).  Across the quintiles, 
relative wages in Hawaii fell 2.4% in the first quintile, rose slightly (1.7%) in the second quintile, 
and fell by about 4-7.5% in the upper three quintiles.  
These wage declines are not readily attributable to Hawaii’s mandate, for two reasons:  
(1) the change in wages is wrong-signed in the second quintile (positive rather than negative), 
and more generally the estimated wage declines in Hawaii are larger in the higher quintiles; these 
findings are inconsistent with the predictions of the supply-demand framework for assessing the 
effects of an employer mandate and also with our prior finding of larger ESI effects in the lower 
quintiles; (2) the estimated Hawaii effect on wage changes is towards the middle of the 
distribution of placebo estimates for other states, so according to our placebo criterion we are 
unable to reject the hypothesis that wage changes in Hawaii were the same as in other states.   
                                                 
22 We based these assumptions on tabulations of employee contributions for health insurance plans, using 
the MEPS-IC data for private-sector establishments in Hawaii and the United States as a whole.  
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As a robustness check, we performed the same placebo test for wage changes using a 
sample restricted to workers in the retail industry, who are among the groups most likely to be 
affected by the mandate.  As shown in Appendix B (Figure B4), the results for this group are 
qualitatively similar to the full sample results.  
It is important to note that a conventional statistical test would imply large negative wage 
effects of Hawaii’s mandate:  for the full sample, the t-statistic on the appropriate Hawaii*period 
interaction in a fully interacted specification with clustered standard errors is -2.94, indicating a 
high degree of statistical significance for the estimated wage declines in Hawaii.  However,  
applying the same statistical test to the other states effects, we obtain t-statistics that exceed an 
absolute value of two in 43 of the 50 cases.  As noted in Section IV, this over-rejection of the 
null of no significant differences between states highlights why we use the placebo approach. 
These results do not necessarily indicate that Hawaii’s ESI mandate had no effect on 
wages, but rather that the effect is not detectable in our data using acceptable statistical criteria.  
Our inability to reject the null of no wage effect is unsurprising, given the very small magnitude 
of the simulated wage offset discussed at the beginning of this sub-section.
23  Based solely on 
this analysis one might conclude from our permutation testing approach that our design is not 
powerful enough to detect effects of Hawaii’s mandate on any labor market outcomes using our 
data.  However, the results discussed in the next section indicate otherwise.  
VI.B. Low Hours Employment 
The second column of Figure 4 and second panel of Table 2 display results from 
regressions that test whether there has been a long-run trend toward exempt part-time (low-
                                                 
23 Our point here is similar to that made by Bhattacharya and Vogt (2000) regarding estimated employment 
effects of state insurance mandates.  Using statistical power functions, they argued that the inability to 
reject the null of no effects in papers such as Gruber (1994) was largely noninformative.   
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hours) work in Hawaii relative to other states, once again showing results for the full sample and 
the breakdown by ESI quintiles.
24 Individuals are identified as working low hours if they 
typically work fewer than 20 hours per week, which is the cutoff for determining whether a 
worker is subject to the provisions of the mandate.   
In the full sample, the estimate of the change effect for Hawaii is positive and exceeds the 
95th percentile critical value from the distribution of placebo estimates; it thereby meets our 
standard for statistical significance, indicating that over the entire period the percentage of adults 
in short-hour jobs grew significantly faster in Hawaii than in other states.  The additional results 
in Figure 4 and Table 2 indicate that this full-sample result is driven primarily by the sub-sample 
with the lowest probability of receiving ESI.  The estimate for this group is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.
25 
The estimated shift toward exempt part-time employment is consistent with findings from 
past research, including anecdotal evidence cited by the U.S. GAO study (1994, page 15) and 
limited quantitative evidence provided in Thurston (1997) and Lee et al. (2005).  These findings 
suggest employer avoidance behavior in response to the mandate, which reduces the costs of the 
mandate and limits its labor market effects.  The size of this reduction in mandate costs is 
economically meaningful, even though the mandate costs themselves are not large.  In particular, 
the estimated increase in part-time work in the first ESI quintile for Hawaii is 3.7 percentage 
points, compared with an estimated increase in own ESI coverage of 7.1 percentage points 
(Table 1, Panel C).  Assuming that all of the increase in low-hours employment offset the 
                                                 
24 See Appendix A for details regarding the hours variable.   
25 A shift towards low-hours work also is evident in the third quintile.  Recall that although the cross-
sectional gap in ESI coverage was fairly large for this quintile, it did not grow significantly over time.  
Therefore, this effect on part-time work reflects the rising burden of the mandate associated with rising 
health insurance costs for groups that have higher coverage rates in Hawaii than in other states.  
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increase in mandated ESI coverage, had the switch to low-hours employment not occurred, the 
increase in ESI coverage would have been 10.8 (7.1+3.7) rather than 7.1 percentage points.  The 
implied reduction in the costs of the mandate is about one-third (3.7/10.8 = 0.34).
26  
We subjected these findings for low-hours work to some of the same robustness and 
falsification tests that we applied to the own ESI results in Section V.C.  The results are 
displayed in Appendix B (difference-differences estimate only).  First, we estimated the low-
hours models for two alternative, intermediate time periods (1990-93 vs. 1979-82, 2002-05 vs. 
1990-93) (Figure B5).  The results indicate that the increase in low-hours work was restricted to 
the second half of our sample frame.  We also estimated the low-hours model for our sample of 
government employees (Figure B6).  The results suggest a switch to low-hours work in the 
higher quintile groups (3rd and 4th; results for the 5
th quintile cannot be estimated), which is 
inconsistent with the expected effects of the mandate and therefore does not falsify our finding 
for private sector workers. 
VI.C. Employment 
The final outcome we consider is employment, which has been the primary focus of 
recent critiques of employer mandates (Yelowitz 2003; Baicker and Levy 2007; Burkhauser and 
Simon 2007).  The last column of Table 2 and bottom panel of Figure 5 displays results from 
                                                 
26 The estimated increase in low-hours employment is of moderate size compared with its base incidence in 
the first ESI quintile.  The share of low-hours employment in this group ranged from about 10-16 percent 
across our sample frame (with a downward trend evident over time), and the increase of 3.7 percentage 
points represents about a 25-35% increase relative to this base level.  Readers may note also that the switch 
to low-hours employment was larger in the first ESI quintile than in the second, despite the larger increase 
in ESI in the second quintile (from Table 1).  This pattern likely arises because employers’ incentives to 
substitute towards low-hours employment depend not just on the mandate costs but also on detailed 
characteristics of their production functions that determine the costs of adjusting employees’ work 
schedules.  Such costs are likely to be small for the low-skill workers most affected by the mandate.   
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regressions that use an indicator for employment status as the dependent variable.
27  The 
specification of these regressions is similar to the model used for wages and part-time work.  
However, the sample now consists of all adults 18 to 64 years old (not just those who are 
employed) and we exclude industry and occupation from the list of controls used in the ESI 
prediction and outcome equations. The results are similar to the wage regressions, indicating that 
although conditional employment probabilities declined in Hawaii over time, the changes do not 
achieve statistical significance at or near the 10 percent level based on our placebo test.
28  The 
sole exception is the fourth ESI quintile, for which a 6.6 percentage point decline in employment 
probabilities was estimated, significant at the 10% level based on our placebo criterion.  Because 
this group was not subject to significant mandate effects on coverage, we regard this result as 
reflecting random elements in the data rather than the impact of the mandate.   
 
VII.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We found that relative ESI coverage rose in Hawaii over time, and the increase was 
larger for workers with characteristics that imply low coverage rates in the absence of a mandate, 
consistent with the standard supply/demand theory regarding the effects of employer mandates.  
This finding meets the stringent standards for statistical significance imposed by our placebo 
testing framework, suggesting that it is a result of the state’s employer mandate rather than 
random factors at the state level.  Our findings regarding alternative coverage sources suggested 
that coverage as a dependent on ESI programs may have declined by a small amount, reducing 
the cost burden of the mandate, although this finding does not achieve statistical significance.  
                                                 
27 Individuals are identified as employed if they report working positive hours for pay during the reference 
week for the monthly CPS files; employment can be private, government, or self-employment.  
28 The t-statistic on the Hawaii*(time period) interaction in a fully interacted specification with clustered 
standard errors is -2.70, indicating significance at the 1% level.  
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By contrast, we found clear and statistically significant evidence of reductions in coverage 
through public programs such as Medicaid, which were of a similar magnitude to the increase in 
ESI among worker groups most affected by the mandate.  
Regarding labor market outcomes, the results from our permutation tests suggest no 
discernable wage effect of the mandate:  the changes in Hawaii’s distribution of wages as the 
costs of the mandate rose are statistically indistinguishable from changes in the wage distribution 
in other states analyzed in a parallel fashion.  Relative wages fell in Hawaii over time, but no 
more so than in many other states, and the decline in relative wages in Hawaii was similar for 
worker groups that differ sharply in regard to the estimated effect of the mandate on ESI 
coverage.  Consistent with prior fragile findings regarding wage reductions due to Hawaii’s 
mandate (Thurston 1997), these results indicate that any wage reductions arising from the 
mandate are too small to be detectable in our data. 
Although we cannot reliably estimate wage offsets resulting from Hawaii’s mandate, it is 
likely that for some groups, such as low-wage workers for whom wage reductions are 
constrained by the minimum wage, any wage reductions will not be large enough to fully offset 
the mandate costs to employers.  Under these circumstances, the basic supply and demand 
framework points to adjustments along other margins.  We uncovered evidence of such 
adjustments, in the form of an increase in the percentage of individuals working less than 20 
hours per week, which is the threshold distinguishing covered and exempt worker under 
Hawaii’s mandate.  The estimated shift towards low-hours schedules was concentrated among 
the worker groups that were most affected by the mandate, which supports the interpretation that 
the shift reflects employers’ direct responses to the mandate.  Using a similar framework, we 
found no statistically detectable changes in relative employment probabilities in Hawaii.  As with  
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our findings for wages, our data and empirical design do not allow us to rule out employment 
reductions arising from the mandate, especially for workers who face low probabilities of 
receiving ESI in a voluntary market.  However, such effects are small relative to the variation in 
other unobserved factors that affect cross-state employment trends.   
Our results on net suggest that Hawaii’s health insurance mandate succeeded in raising 
ESI coverage rates for worker groups with low coverage rates in an unconstrained environment, 
but the costs of this coverage expansion were small compared with other factors affecting labor 
demand across states.  Our results regarding declines in public coverage indicate that expanded 
ESI coverage served largely to shift the coverage burden from public programs to the private 
sector.  While Hawaii is a somewhat unique state in terms of geography, our analyses indicate 
that it is not an outlier in regard to labor market characteristics, suggesting that ESI mandates 
may cause limited labor market distortions in other states as well.  On the other hand, Hawaii’s 
employer mandate has left the state well short of universal coverage, suggesting a need for 
alternative approaches to expanding coverage if that is the ultimate policy goal. 
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Source:  HMSA, single coverage health insurance premium; deflated using
the CPI for Honolulu.
(per hour basis, $2005)















1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year














1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year














1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
Hawaii U.S. less Hawaii Difference
Panel C: College Degree or More
Note:  Authors' tabulations (weighted) from March CPS files, 1980-2006.
(private sector employees, age 18-64)






















































































































































































































































































































































-.15 0 .15 .3
State effects
5th quintile, Difference
Note:  Estimated using March CPS data, private sector workers age 18-64.
The dashed lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii),
the solid line is the Hawaii value.  Logit models; covariates include the
complete set of demographic/state and job controls (see Table 1).  Effects
estimated as treatment on the treated, converted to percentages (see text).
Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI), structure estimated for U.S. ex.
Hawaii (see text).
Estimates for 1979-82, 2002-05, difference (02-05 minus 79-82)
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-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
State effects
PUBLIC, quintile 5
Note:  Estimated using March CPS data, private sector workers age 18-64.
The dashed lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii),
the solid line is the Hawaii value.  Logit models; covariates include the
complete set of demographic/state and job controls (see Table 1).  Effects
estimated as treatment on the treated, converted to percentages (see text).
Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI), structure estimated for U.S. ex.
Hawaii (see text).
Difference estimates (2002-05 minus 1979-82)























































































































































































































































































































































-.075 -.025 .025 .075
State effects
EMPLOYED, quintile 5
Note:  Estimated using CPS MORG data, individuals age 18-64 (private
sector workers for wages/hours, all individuals for employment).  The dashed
lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii), the solid
line is the Hawaii value.  Regressions are log-linear for wages (coefficients
converted to % effects), logit models for Pr(hours<20) and Pr(employed) in
the current job (effects are treatment on the treated, converted to percentages;
see text).  Full controls used (see Table 1), except ind/occ excluded from
the employment regression.  Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI), structure
estimated using March CPS data, U.S. excluding Hawaii obs (see text).
Difference estimates (2002-05 minus 1979-82)
Figure 5: State Effects (percentages), Labor Market Outcomes (by quintile) 
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Full sample
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Hawaii effect 0.139* 0.209* 0.133* 0.132** 0.085** 0.002
      95
th percentile 0.046 0.066 0.065 0.055 0.045 0.031
      5
th percentile -0.046 -0.062 -0.070 -0.070 -0.052 -0.046
Full sample
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Hawaii effect 0.181** 0.281** 0.232** 0.142** 0.101** 0.031
      95
th percentile 0.043 0.045 0.062 0.054 0.045 0.039
      5
th percentile -0.057 -0.067 -0.069 -0.070 -0.054 -0.052
Full sample
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Hawaii effect 0.042 0.071* 0.099* 0.011 0.016 0.030
      95
th percentile 0.051 0.067 0.087 0.077 0.052 0.049
      5
th percentile -0.046 -0.076 -0.065 -0.066 -0.068 -0.040
** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests based on the distribution of placebo effects)
Note:  Estimated using March CPS data, private sector workers age 18-64, controlling for 
demographic, state, and job characteristics.  The demographic characteristics are education (5 
categories), a quartic in age, gender, gender by age quartic interactions, married, married by gender 
interaction, race/ethnicity (4 categories), residence in an urban area, and veteran status.  State 
characteristics (annual) include union density plus the values of the real minimum wage and real 
GDP growth.   The job characteristics are industry (13) and occupation (11) categories (see 
Appendix B).  Effects are treatment on the treated, converted to percentage effects (see text).  
Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI), structure estimated using U.S. excluding Hawaii observations 
(see discussion in the text).
Table 1:  State Effects (percentages), Own ESI Coverage (by quintile)
(placebo tests, Hawaii vs. all other states)
Panel A:  1979-1982
ESI Quintiles
Panel B:  2002-2005
ESI Quintiles
Panel C:  Difference (2002-05 minus 1979-82)
ESI Quintiles
Placebo effects (other states)
Placebo tests (other states)




1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Hawaii effect -0.035 -0.034 -0.005 -0.044 -0.070 -0.092
      95
th percentile 0.089 0.121 0.093 0.101 0.096 0.111
      5
th percentile -0.136 -0.125 -0.119 -0.136 -0.155 -0.189
Full sample
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Hawaii effect 0.014* 0.037* 0.009 0.017* -0.006 0.000
      95
th percentile 0.009 0.031 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.004
      5
th percentile -0.012 -0.049 -0.026 -0.019 -0.010 -0.003
Full sample
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Hawaii effect -0.021 -0.045 -0.022 0.001 -0.066* 0.000
      95
th percentile 0.030 0.042 0.065 0.030 0.042 0.041
      5
th percentile -0.032 -0.062 -0.060 -0.040 -0.037 -0.031
** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests based on the distribution of placebo effects)
Note:  Estimated using CPS MORG data, individuals age 18-64 (private sector workers for 
wages/hours, all individuals for employment).  Regressions are log-linear for wages (coefficients 
converted to % effects), logit models for Pr(hours<20)and Pr(employed) in current job (effects are 
treatment on the treated, converted to percentages; see text).  Full controls used (see Table 1), 
except ind/occ excluded from the employment regression.  Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI), 
structure estimated using March CPS data, U.S. excluding Hawaii obs (see text).
Table 2:  State Effects (percentages), Labor Market Outcomes (by quintile)
(placebo tests, Hawaii vs. all other states)
Panel A:  ln(hourly wage)  (private sector workers, age 18-64)
ESI Quintiles
Placebo effects (other states)
Panel B:  Pr(weekly hours<20) (private sector workers, age 18-64) 
Difference estimates (2002-05 minus 1979-82)
ESI Quintiles
Placebo tests (other states)
Panel C:  Pr(employed) (all individuals age 18-64)
ESI Quintiles
Placebo tests (other states) 
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Appendix A:  CPS March and MORG Data 
  Our data are from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Demographic Supplement 
(conducted each year in March, hence referred to as the March CPS) and the Monthly Outgoing 
Rotation Group (MORG) files.  We used the processed March files from Unicon Research 
Corporation (www.unicon.com) and the MORG files from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (www.nber.org/data/morg.html).  We describe the characteristics of each source and 
our specific data choices in detail here.  For each data set, the analyses are primarily limited to 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 64 who are employed by a private sector firm; the 
exceptions include the employment analyses, for which the sample is all individuals age 18-64, 
and selected analyses that focus on government workers (again age 18-64).  All calculations are 
weighted using each survey’s sampling weights. 
March CPS Health Insurance and Pension Data 
  We use the March CPS data for our analyses of employer-sponsored health insurance 
coverage (ESI).  Since the 1980 survey, respondents have been asked about health insurance 
coverage on their longest job held in the preceding year, but the specifics of the question have 
changed over time.  Before the 1988 survey, the ESI question was posed to all working 
individuals.  After 1988, the question was posed to all individuals who had health insurance 
coverage in their own name.  This change in definition creates a series break for tabulations of 
health insurance coverage, and the Census has chosen not to release such tabulations for calendar 
years prior to 1987.  However, Census Bureau correspondence available in the Unicon data 
documentation indicates that the impact of the 1988 questionnaire change was more significant 
for the measurement of sources of health insurance other than ESI (primarily private coverage 
other than ESI).    
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Beginning in 1995, respondents were asked a series of verification questions if their 
initial response indicated that they were not covered by ESI; additional verification questions 
were added in 2000.  The verification questions increase estimated ESI coverage by an amount 
that is small but nontrivial from the perspective of national coverage totals.  To attain the highest 
consistency across our sample frame, we used an ESI variable that is defined without reliance on 
the verification questions, although we ascertained in preliminary analyses that using the 
verification questions does not materially affect our results.   
  The March CPS files also provide data on health insurance sources other than own ESI, 
including ESI as a dependent, other sources of private coverage, and coverage through 
government programs (primarily Medicare, Medicaid, and programs for military veterans).  Prior 
to survey year 1995 (reference year 1994), information on private coverage sources other than 
ESI is unavailable in some years and not consistently measured over time, with a notable break 
in survey year 1988.  We therefore are unable to form and directly analyze measures of overall 
private coverage, total coverage, and uninsurance rates.  However, we formed and analyze a 
series for ESI coverage as a dependent.  This variable is directly identified in the data beginning 
with the 1995 survey.  For prior years, we identify it by combining information on ESI coverage 
in any form (own or dependent) and own ESI coverage:  individuals with ESI coverage but not 
own ESI are labeled as having ESI as a dependent.  Throughout the sample frame, we eliminate 
overlapping coverage from the definition of the ESI variables; individuals with own and 
dependent ESI are labeled as having own ESI only.  We also formed and analyze a series 
representing coverage through any government source, which is measured consistently over time 
in the March data files.  We exclude overlapping coverage for this variable as well (see footnote 
17 in the text).  
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  The analysis of pension outcomes discussed in section V.C. relied on two pension 
variables that are consistently defined over our CPS sample frame.  These variables measure 
whether an individual’s employer offers pensions to any employees and whether the individual is 
covered by the pension plan.  Both of these indicator variables are defined relative to the 
complete sample; because an individual’s employer must offer a pension plan in order for the 
individuals to be covered, the share of individuals whose employers offer pensions is an upper-
bound for the share who are covered by a pension.  In our sample, the weighted means for these 
two variables across all years are in the range of 0.5-0.55 for pension availability and 0.4 for 
pension coverage. 
MORG Data (variable definitions, top-coding, and imputation) 
  We use the MORG data for our analyses of wage, hours, and employment outcomes.  As 
noted in the text (footnote 5), compared with the March data, the MORG provides larger sample 
sizes for more precise point-in-time measures of these variables.  (We conducted preliminary 
outcome analyses using the March data and found results that were similar but less precise than 
those obtained using the MORG data, which is as expected given the smaller sample sizes in the 
March data.)  Our hourly wage variable is defined as reported hourly earnings for those paid by 
the hour and usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours for salaried employees.  We 
used the CPI for all urban consumers to deflate hourly wages and other dollar-denominated 
figures, using the CPI for the Honolulu metro area to deflate the Hawaii figures and the all-U.S. 
series for other states.   
We limited the wage analyses to individuals whose hourly wage is greater than $1 (in 
2005 dollars); this is similar to but slightly less restrictive than Lemieux’s rule based on an 
hourly wage of $1 in 1979 dollars, to account for the possibility of extensive sub-minimum wage  
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(tipped) work in Hawaii.  We multiplied the value of top-coded earnings observations by 1.4; 
this largely follows Lemieux (2006), with the exception that for the sake of consistency over 
time, we did not rely on the higher topcode enabled by the use of unedited earnings values for 
the years 1989-1993.   
We also relied on the usual weekly hours variable to identify individuals who work fewer 
than 20 hours per week.  Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) noted that this hours variable is not 
consistently available over time, causing missing observations for the 7-9 percent of the sample 
after 1994 who report that their hours of work vary.  We excluded these observations from the 
sample rather than follow Autor et al’s approach of relying on a variable that measures hours 
worked at all jobs during the reference week, because we need precise information on weekly 
hours at sample members’ primary job in order to analyze the incidence of low-hours 
employment.  As noted in the text, we obtain similar results for the hours analysis when we use 
the alternative variable based on hours worked in all jobs (the same is true for the wage analysis).   
  As discussed by Lemieux (2006) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), the incidence of 
imputed values of earnings and hours is substantial in both CPS data sources and has grown over 
time.  Because the Census “hot deck” matching procedure used for imputation does not restrict 
donor matches to individuals in the same state, our results, which focus on one small state, could 
be substantially biased if we included imputed observations. We therefore dropped observations 
with imputed values of earnings from the analysis of earnings and observations with imputed 
values of hours worked from the analysis of low-hours work.
29  We followed the procedures 
outlined in Lemieux (2006) for identifying imputed earnings observations (including the 
                                                 
29 Because the frequency of imputation is much higher for earnings that it is for hours, our analysis samples 
are larger for the low-hours equations (see the observation counts for the cross-section equations reported 
in Appendix C).  
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comparison of unedited and edited earnings values during the years 1989-1993, when the 
earnings imputation flags are incorrect).  Supplementary analyses conducted for various 
specifications indicated that the results are similar when imputed values are included. 
Industry and Occupation Codes 
  Most of our analyses include industry and occupation controls (see Appendix B, Table 
B1, for the categories).  These definitions have changed over time, with especially large changes 
in the 2003 data year, due to the switch to the new NAICS codes.  We formed consistent broad 
categories over time based on a comprehensive examination of the codes and consequent 
reclassification of some industry categories.  These recoding schemes are available on request. 
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Appendices B and C:  SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS 









Age (years) 35.7 35.2 38.6 38.3
Married 0.574 0.598 0.506 0.540
Female 0.506 0.450 0.482 0.470
MSA 0.304 0.666 0.755 0.704
Vet 0.139 0.188 0.065 0.071
Education
<High School 0.147 0.212 0.075 0.127
High School 0.388 0.396 0.319 0.320
Some College 0.294 0.246 0.344 0.304
College Grad 0.111 0.089 0.206 0.179
>College 0.060 0.057 0.057 0.070
Race/Ethnicity
White 0.290 0.825 0.176 0.685
Black 0.007 0.097 0.012 0.109
Hispanic 0.022 0.058 0.068 0.146
Other 0.681 0.020 0.744 0.059
Nativity
U.S.-born n/a n/a 0.769 0.839
Foreign-born citizen n/a n/a 0.133 0.057
Non-citizen n/a n/a 0.098 0.104
Firm size
<10 emps n/a n/a 0.164 0.155
10-24 emps n/a n/a 0.127 0.118
25-99 emps n/a n/a 0.180 0.156
100-499 emps n/a n/a 0.154 0.151
500+ emps n/a n/a 0.376 0.421
(continued)
Appendix Table B1: Population Characteristics, Hawaii vs. Other States
1979-1982 (reference years) 2002-2005 (reference years)












Agriculture 0.045 0.021 0.017 0.011
Mining 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.005
Construction 0.077 0.063 0.093 0.077
Manufact. (non-dur) 0.060 0.115 0.024 0.057
Manufact. (dur.) 0.024 0.172 0.021 0.096
TCPU 0.086 0.070 0.080 0.070
Whlsle Trade 0.054 0.048 0.036 0.038
Retail Trade 0.244 0.194 0.150 0.142
F.I.R.E. 0.111 0.070 0.077 0.080
Business Services 0.061 0.045 0.085 0.077
Personal Services 0.085 0.038 0.187 0.103
Entertainment Serv. 0.015 0.012 0.019 0.018
Prof. Services 0.135 0.139 0.208 0.225
Occupation
Managerial 0.097 0.090 0.124 0.128
Professional 0.105 0.098 0.114 0.135
Technical 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.029
Sales 0.103 0.082 0.131 0.129
Administrative 0.195 0.187 0.159 0.148
Services 0.196 0.134 0.225 0.163
Prod/craft/repair 0.117 0.142 0.097 0.090
Oper/fab/labor 0.059 0.135 0.041 0.086
Trans/movers 0.039 0.042 0.044 0.045
Handlers/cleaners 0.042 0.054 0.030 0.038
Farm 0.032 0.016 0.015 0.009
Sample size 2,477 230,619 4,507 297,649
Note:  Authors' calculations from March CPS data, private sector workers age 18-64 
(weighted). 
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-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
State effects
02-05 vs. 90-93, quintile 5
Note:  Estimated using March CPS data, private sector workers age 18-64.
The dashed lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii),
the solid line is the Hawaii value.  Logit models; covariates include the
complete set of demographic/state and job controls (see Table 1).  Effects
estimated as treatment on the treated, converted to percentages (see text).
Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI), structure estimated for U.S. ex.
Hawaii (see text).
Difference estimates (90-93 vs. 79-82, 02-05 vs. 90-93)
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State effects
Pension coverage, quintile 5
Note:  Estimated using March CPS data, private sector workers age 18-64.
The dashed lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii),
the solid line is the Hawaii value.  Logit models; covariates include the
complete set of demographic/state and job controls (see Table 1).  Effects
estimated as treatment on the treated, converted to percentages (see text).
Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(pension), structure estimated for U.S. ex.
Hawaii (see text).
Difference estimates (2002-05 minus 1979-82)








































































































































































































































































































































































-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
State effects
5th quintile, Difference
Note:  Estimated using March CPS data.  The thin dotted lines are the 2.5 and
97.5 percentile values (other than Hawaii), the thick solid line is the Hawaii
value.  Logit models; covariates include the complete set of demographic/state
and job controls (see Table 1), except industry/occupation.  Effects estimated
as treatment on the treated (see text).  Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI)
(government employees only), structure estimated for U.S. ex. Hawaii (see text).
Estimates for 1979-82, 2002-05, difference (02-05 minus 79-82)

















































































































-.3 -.15 0 .15
State effects
WAGE, quintile 5
Note:  Estimated using CPS MORG data, individuals age 18-64 (retail employees only).
The dashed lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii), the solid line is
the Hawaii value. Regressions are log-linear for wages (coefficients converted to % effects).
Full controls used (see Table 1), except industry and occupation.  Quintiles formed using
March CPS, fitted Pr(ESI), structure estimated for U.S. ex. Hawaii (see text).
Difference estimates (2002-05 minus 1979-82)
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State effects
02-05 vs. 90-93, quintile 5
Note:  Estimated using CPS MORG data, private sector workers age 18-64.
The dashed lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii),
the solid line is the Hawaii value.  Logit models; covariates include the
complete set of demographic/state and job controls (see Table 1).  Effects
estimated as treatment on the treated, converted to percentages (see text).
Quintiles formed using fitted Pr(ESI), structure estimated for U.S. ex.
Hawaii (see text).
Difference estimates (90-93 vs. 79-82, 02-05 vs. 90-93)
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State effects
HOURS<20, quintile 4
Note:  Estimated using CPS MORG data, individuals age 18-64 (government employees only).  The
dashed lines are the 5th and 95th percentile values (other than Hawaii), the solid line is the Hawaii
value.  Logit models; effects are treatment on the treated, converted to percentages (see text).  Full
controls used (see Table 1), except industry and occupation.  Quintiles formed using March CPS,
fitted Pr(ESI) (government employees ony), structure estimated for U.S. ex. Hawaii (see text).  Due
to lack of variation, the Hawaii effect cannot be estimated for quintile 5 (hours<20); also, quintile
4 is based on 49 states other than Hawaii (rather than 50).
Difference estimates (2002-05 minus 1979-82)
Figure B6: State Effects, Low Hours (by quintile)
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
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(Table 1, Panel B)
Log(wage), 
2002-05 (used 
for Table 2, 
Panel A)
Low Hours (logit), 
2002-05 (used for 
Table 2, Panel B)
Employed (logit), 
2002-05 (used for 
Table 2, Panel C)
Hawaii dummy 0.914** -0.00738 -0.0851 0.405**
(0.0781) (0.0209) (0.0714) (0.0488)
Ln(state min. wage) -0.0908 0.258** 0.237 -0.0442
(0.160) (0.0612) (0.190) (0.166)
Change in ln(state GDP) 0.0750 0.0749 -2.538* 0.524
(1.087) (0.272) (1.177) (0.467)
State union density (nonfarm) 0.000770 0.00597** 0.0125** -0.00733*
(0.00387) (0.00136) (0.00393) (0.00365)
Age 2.411** 0.0397** -2.879** 1.436**
(0.114) (0.0139) (0.212) (0.0603)
Age
2/10 -0.836** 0.000706 1.042** -0.512**
(0.0440) (0.00566) (0.0864) (0.0227)
Age
3/1000 1.266** -0.0132 -1.662** 0.810**
(0.0727) (0.00984) (0.147) (0.0368)
Age
4/100,000 -0.705** 0.00991 0.993** -0.490**
(0.0436) (0.00619) (0.0888) (0.0216)
HS degree 0.576** 0.131** -0.418** 0.734**
(0.0190) (0.00950) (0.0370) (0.0265)
Some college 0.628** 0.221** 0.0798* 0.936**
(0.0242) (0.0111) (0.0327) (0.0318)
College degree 0.813** 0.404** 0.0528 1.242**
(0.0275) (0.0138) (0.0582) (0.0374)
Post-college degree 0.943** 0.599** -0.106 1.513**
(0.0312) (0.0157) (0.0663) (0.0444)
Female -5.577** -0.497** 3.088 5.977**
(1.228) (0.160) (1.979) (0.505)
Female*Age 0.631** 0.0465* -0.455 -0.583**
(0.133) (0.0189) (0.233) (0.0593)
Female*(Age
2/10) -0.253** -0.0172* 0.230* 0.179**
(0.0517) (0.00795) (0.0960) (0.0244)
Female*(Age
3/1000) 0.421** 0.0241 -0.436** -0.219**
(0.0858) (0.0142) (0.165) (0.0422)
Female*(Age
4/100,000) -0.248** -0.0110 0.271** 0.0939**
(0.0515) (0.00908) (0.101) (0.0261)
Married 0.0935** 0.130** -0.767** 0.884**
(0.0216) (0.00400) (0.0622) (0.0141)
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(Table 1, Panel B)
Log(wage), 
2002-05 (used 
for Table 2, 
Panel A)
Low Hours (logit), 
2002-05 (used for 
Table 2, Panel B)
Employed (logit), 
2002-05 (used for 
Table 2, Panel C)
Married*female -0.876** -0.103** 1.459** -1.245**
(0.0345) (0.00410) (0.0673) (0.0310)
Black -0.0527* -0.105** -0.595** -0.427**
(0.0232) (0.0108) (0.0428) (0.0331)
Non-white/black -0.178** -0.0818** -0.278** -0.434**
(0.0330) (0.00798) (0.0438) (0.0505)
Hispanic -0.294** -0.154** -0.703** -0.0862*
(0.0240) (0.0129) (0.0511) (0.0356)
MSA residence 0.116** 0.143** -0.0609 0.0105
(0.0272) (0.00945) (0.0374) (0.0348)
Veteran -0.0389 -0.0115* -0.0465 -0.168**
(0.0270) (0.00503) (0.0478) (0.0153)
Industries:  Mining 1.516** 0.459** -1.580** --
(0.120) (0.0357) (0.299)
Construction 0.156* 0.282** -0.568** --
(0.0740) (0.0164) (0.120)
Manufacturing (non-dur) 1.259** 0.264** -1.241** --
(0.106) (0.0160) (0.125)
Manufacturing (durable) 1.267** 0.287** -1.706** --
(0.0824) (0.0159) (0.138)
Trans/comm/public utilities 0.936** 0.281** -0.582** --
(0.0843) (0.0147) (0.120)
Wholesale trade 0.994** 0.238** -1.018** --
(0.0790) (0.0142) (0.110)
Retail trade 0.476** 0.0181 -0.191 --
(0.0756) (0.0140) (0.101)
Finance/ins/real estate 0.837** 0.271** -0.937** --
(0.0855) (0.0154) (0.113)
Business services 0.186* 0.177** -0.355** --
(0.0784) (0.0157) (0.113)
Personal services -0.0983 0.0246 -0.0549 --
(0.105) (0.0173) (0.102)
Entertainment services 0.433** 0.0656** 0.377** --
(0.122) (0.0180) (0.124)









(Table 1, Panel B)
Log(wage), 
2002-05 (used 
for Table 2, 
Panel A)
Low Hours (logit), 
2002-05 (used for 
Table 2, Panel B)
Employed (logit), 
2002-05 (used for 
Table 2, Panel C)
Occupations:  Managerial 1.095** 0.396** -0.849** --
(0.0780) (0.0155) (0.133)
Professional 0.833** 0.366** 0.141 --
(0.0764) (0.0155) (0.121)
Technical 0.928** 0.319** -0.0485 --
(0.0788) (0.0132) (0.121)
Sales 0.446** 0.180** 0.255* --
(0.0699) (0.0148) (0.109)
Administrative 0.751** 0.0904** 0.101 --
(0.0735) (0.0135) (0.111)
Service 0.212** -0.0102 0.585** --
(0.0747) (0.0122) (0.108)
Prod/craft/repair 0.640** 0.189** -0.776** --
(0.0785) (0.0147) (0.129)
Operators 0.541** 0.0364* -0.125 --
(0.0759) (0.0137) (0.124)
Transportation/moving 0.325** 0.0374* 0.232 --
(0.0732) (0.0140) (0.128)
Handlers/cleaners 0.173* -0.0241 0.352** --
(0.0822) (0.0127) (0.113)
Constant -26.70** 0.513** 25.33** -13.82**
(1.059) (0.167) (1.747) (0.626)
Observations 302156 350191 513086 6984926
R-squared -- 0.464 -- --
Note:  Omitted categories are  education <high school degree, white race, agriculture industry, and 
farming occupations.  Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (based on conventional t-tests)  
 
 